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Land Reform Effects on Human Capital Investment and Productivity: 




Land reforms were successfully implemented in the state of West Bengal through 
a special program undertaken in 1978 by the then state government. These reforms 
brought large amount of land under permanent and inheritable tenancy. We use a 
survey data of more than 9000 plots from 2000 households in 142 villages in West 
Bengal to ascertain that both productivity and long-term investments on such land 
are significantly lower than the land under ownership. We also find evidence for 
disparate levels of input usage on the tenancy plots as compared to those which 
are fully owned by the cultivator. Programs to allow land reform beneficiaries to 
acquire full ownership could thus have significant benefits.  
 
1. Introduction  
Land holdings in India were historically distributed in a highly unequal fashion, and have 
always been used as a source of social power. Ensuring secure access to land for the poor and 
landless had been the key motivation for India's land reform since independence. Since then a 
number of land reforms have been carried out by the government – abolition of ‘Zamindari’ or 
middlemen as revenue collectors, imposing ceiling on landholdings and awarding of the surplus 
land’s rights to landless, and tenancy reforms (Mearns, 1998). While abolition of intermediaries 
has  been  implemented  swiftly  and successfully  without  much  obstacle,  the implementation  of 
ceiling and tenancy reforms are vehemently challenged.   
Land  reforms  have  impacted  12.4  mn  tenants  on  15.6  mn  acres  of  land  through 
redistribution of ownership rights or by providing them secure access as per the Government of 
India records until 2002 (Hanstad et al., 2008). Total area affected in India is more than three times 
what was involved in the well-known land reforms of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan together (King 
1977).   However, the implementation of the land reform in India has varied vastly across states.  
The two states that have been most successful in implementing tenancy and ceiling reforms are 
West Bengal and Kerala (Ghatak and Roy, 2007).  In West Bengal this was achieved by the launch 
of a tenant registration drive in 1978, popularly known as “Operation Barga”. This was a program 3 
 
designed  to  implement  tenancy  laws  that  regulated  rent  and  provided  security  of  tenure  to 
sharecroppers. Due to subsequent successful implementation of the tenancy laws in West Bengal, 
we look at the evidence of impact of reforms in this state.  
Despite  considerable  interest  in  the  topic  at  the  policy  level  and  a  large  literature 
documenting  the  way  land  reforms  were  put  in  practice  at  the  state  level  (Yugandhar  1996, 
Thangaraj 2004), quantitative evidence on their impact is limited. Up to now all of the evidence on 
land reform impacts has been at a highly aggregate level (state or district level) and failed to 
distinguish the types of reform with varying outcomes. The high aggregation clearly limits the 
policy relevance of these studies.   
Besley and Burgess (2000) using all-India data exploit interstate variations and find that 
the number of identifiable land reform laws across states is positively related to the extent of 
poverty reduction but not agricultural productivity.  Using the same data, Ghatak and Roy (2007) 
find that the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity depends on the type of reform. 
They  also  check  the  robustness  of  results  by  using  additional  measures  of  productivity  from 
alternate datasets.  Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) use district level data from West Bengal to 
conclude  reforms  improved  productivity,  and  can  explain  28  percent  of  the  agricultural 
productivity  growth  occurring post  reforms.  Similarly,  Bardhan  and  Mookherjee  (2007)  use  a 
village level land reform data to conclude a positive impact on productivity. Reforms also affect 
the accumulation of human and physical capital of the beneficiary households (Deininger et al. 
2008).  Given the evidence that poor and landless are likely to benefit most from land reform 
(Besley and Burgess 2001; Deininger et al. 2008), role of tenancy reforms in enhancing human 
capital investment of children of bargadars household is an important long-term impact of these 
reform.  
The policy relevance of studying the impact of land reform at individual beneficiary level 
has well emphasized in the literature (Ghatak and Roy, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2007).  
Data limitation is probably the single most important reason why almost all the studies on this 4 
 
topic are based on aggregate data.  In this paper, we are able to fill in this knowledge gap by using  
plot level production and investment data from a large sample of households from West Bengal, 
one  of  the  Indian  state  where  land  reform  implementation,  through  the  award  of  permanent 
tenancy rights to barga land following the ascent to power of the Communist Party in 1978, has 
made the greatest advances. We test whether there is Marshallian inefficiency associated with the 
tenancy land by comparing crop productivity, input use intensity and land investment between 
barga  land  and  land  with  ownership  after  household  fixed  effects  and  plot  characteristics  are 
controlled for. We find that the differentials between the output values and yield exist because of 
tenancy status. These differences are of the magnitude of -.217 to -.07, depending upon the season 
and crop under investigation. We also find the tenancy land is negatively related to input use 
intensity and farmers decisions of land investments.  Our results suggest that land under reform is 
less productive as compared to owned land under cultivation due to the disincentives associated 
with sharing contracts. These results suggest awarding full ownership to beneficiaries could be 
efficiency-enhancing.    
The paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses land reform in a global context. Section 
three  describes  data  sources  and  discusses  descriptive  statistics  on  reform  targeting,  and  the 
comparison in productivity, input use and long-term investments between reform land and own 
land. The econometric results are presented in section four and section five concludes by briefly 
discussing policy implications. 
2. Background and relation to the literature  
This section reviews the rationale and level of land reform implementation -globally and in India- 
highlighting main types of land reform and the quantitative accomplishments under each of them. 
We use this as a basis to formulate hypotheses on the impact of different types of land reform and 
their evolution over time and to outline our strategy that will allow us to assess these empirically 
using the data at hand.  5 
 
2.1 Land reform in a global context 
A  large  body  of  empirical  literature  on  agricultural  production  has  shown  that,  due  to  the 
transaction  costs  involved  in  supervising  hired  labor  (Carter  1984,  Feder  1985,  Eswaran  and 
Kotwal 1985, Benjamin 1995), a farm structure based on owner-operated units is more efficient 
than one based on wage labor (Berry and Cline 1979, Binswanger et al. 1995). Although market 
mechanisms can, in principle, help to equalize the operational land distribution and thus maximize 
aggregate production, challenges remain. First, transaction costs and borrowing constraints may 
reduce the number of market transactions well below the optimum. Second, to the extent that 
transactions in rental and sales markets require transfers of resources among the parties involved 
even productivity-enhancing transactions may have undesirable distributional implications. At low 
levels  of  development, and especially  with  high inequality  in the land  ownership  distribution, 
landlords may be able to reduce the benefits to tenants by exerting market power. At higher levels 
of development, speculative elements may cause a discrepancy between the market value of land 
and  its  underlying  ‘fundamental’  value  based  on  profits  from  agricultural  production,  thereby 
preventing movement of land to the most productive producers. Third, with imperfections in other 
markets, e.g. those for labor or credit, market transactions may not achieve first best outcomes in 
terms of production. As a result, government interventions that aim to provide the most productive 
producers with land access can have significant social and economic benefits (Chau 1998, Carter 
and Zimmerman 2000).  
In addition to its potential to increase productivity, land reform can, through its possible effect on 
credit markets, also affect productive investment. It can have additional impacts by overcoming 
some  of  the  negative  consequences  of  a  highly  unequal  distribution  of  asset  ownership  and 
economic opportunities. One frequently cited issue is that, with credit market imperfections, the 
poor may not be able to attain the level of indivisible investment in human or physical capital that 
would correspond to their innate ability (Galor and Zeira 1993, Gersbach and Siemers 2005). In 6 
 
such situations, exogenous increases of asset endowments can bring the level of investment closer 
to  the social optimum  and also  be beneficial to the individuals concerned. A second possible 
reason is that limited access  to  economic resources  is likely  to  translate  into  limited  political 
influence, possibly giving rise to a vicious and self-perpetuating circle of high inequality, bad 
institutions,  and  low  economic  growth  (Acemoglu  et  al.  2004).  Also,  a  tendency  towards 
segregation may affect communities’ ability to supply local public goods and, to the extent that 
these  are  essential  inputs  into  private  production,  trap  the  poor  in  an  undesirable  equilibrium 
(Durlauf 1996, Cardenas 2003). This can be pronounced in cases where what is produced are 
public “bads” such as violence, social unrest, and strife, which are associated with significant 
economic as well as social costs.
1  
The potential productivity and social benefits from a more egalitarian distribution of land, often 
combined  with  arguments  in  favor  of  historical  justice,  have  provided  a  justification  for 
redistributive policies in many countries. The goal was to establish a foundation for an inclusive 
and broad-based pattern of economic development in some of the world’s most unequal societies. 
The review of land reform episodes in table 1 illustrates that the magnitude of such efforts, in 
terms of the number of beneficiaries and the size of area redistributed, was enormous.
2 Well-
known land reforms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan at the end of World War II redistributed between 
30% and 40% of the cultivated area, affecting about two thirds of rural households. Although they 
were  drawn  out  over  longer  time  periods,  reforms  in  Bolivia,  Nicaragua,  Peru,  and  Mexico, 
affected sizeable portions of their countries’ arable land endowment and benefited up to a third of 
the rural population.  
                                                 
1 For a theoretical underpinning for the relationship between distribution and provision of public goods, including social cohesion, see 
(Bardhan and Ghatak 1999). It has also been shown that, especially in rural environments where other markets are imperfect, such 
interventions can help improve their nutritional status, risk-bearing capacity, and investment incentives, in addition to enhancing their 
ability to access credit markets (Burgess 2001).  
2 The purpose of this table is illustrative, to provide an indication of the orders of magnitude involved. Figures on area redistributed and 
number of beneficiary households are taken from the cited sources and percentages have been calculated by taking the total area of 
arable land (from FAO statistics) and the rural population divided by 5 (to obtain an estimate of the number of rural households).  7 
 
Compared to the magnitude of these efforts, evidence on their effect is scant and often focused on 
outputs rather than impact based on a rigorous counterfactual. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, land 
reforms  helped  improve  productivity  and  set  the  stage  for  an  impressive  increase  in  non-
agricultural  development  (Jeon  and  Kim  2000).  In  the  Philippines,  early  land  reforms  that 
benefited more than 0.5 million households and green revolution technology, improved household 
welfare (Otsuka 1991, Balisacan and Fuwa 2004) and increased investment and human capital 
accumulation  (Deininger  and  Olinto  2001).  Although  quite  effective,  land  reforms  undertaken 
immediately after independence in some African countries, e.g. Kenya  and Zimbabwe (Scott 1976, 
Gunning and et al 2000, Deininger et al. 2004) were often abandoned for political reasons (Kinsey 
and Binswanger 1993). In Latin America, reforms distributed comparatively large amounts of land 
(Barraclough  1970,  Eckstein  and  Horton  1978,  Jarvis  1989)  but  often  failed  to  improve 
productivity and were insufficient to help overcome deep-rooted structural inequalities (de Janvry 
and Sadoulet 1989). Following a relative decline of interest in the topic during the late 1970s, it 
received renewed attention recently,
3 partly due to the fact that, even if accompanied by high 
levels of growth, macro-economic reforms in countries characterized by high land inequality often 
failed to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. More importantly, the task which the 
original  reforms  set  out  to  accomplish  remains  in  many  respects  unfinished  (Lipton  1993). 
Together with a strong political appeal of land redistribution, this has recently prompted countries 
as diverse as Brazil, Bolivia, South Africa, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe to renew 
their land reform efforts.  
2.2 Land reform implementation in India  
In  India,  land  reform,  implementation  of  which  is  the  responsibility  of  individual  states,  has 
occupied a central stage in the policy debate for long time, given inequality in the distribution of 
productive assets, especially land, which the country inherited from its colonial masters. Reforms 
                                                 
3 For recent contributions on land reform see (Boyce et al. 1998, Bandiera 2003, Bobrow-Strain 2004, Borras, Jr. 2005, Bradstock 2005, 
Eastwood et al. 2006).  8 
 
had three main elements (Mearns 1999), namely (i) abolition of intermediaries (zamindars) shortly 
after independence; (ii) tenancy laws to increase tenure security by sitting tenants by registering 
them and often imposing restrictions on the amount of rent they had to pay or the scope for new 
rental transactions;
4 (iii) ceiling laws that provided a basis for expropriating land held by any given 
owner in excess of a state-specific ceiling and subsequently transferring it to poor farmers or 
landless agricultural workers. While the first of these is considered to have been highly successful, 
progress on the remainder was initially very slow, accelerating only during the 1970s and slowing 
down again in the 1980s. Still, both types of intervention resulted in the transfer of rights to almost 
10 mn hectares of land, an area more than three times what was involved in the well-known land 
reforms of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan together (King 1977). With the exception of few states, the 
political commitment to implement reforms was limited and sometimes outcomes were counter to 
what had been desired, as with large-scale tenant evictions to prevent them from gaining more 
permanent land rights in anticipation of tenancy laws (Appu 1997). 
Table 2 provide summary statistics for the level of land reform implementation, measured as the 
share of rural population who received land through tenancy reform, the area transferred as a result 
of ceiling legislation, or the number of ceiling laws, by state based on a summary report that draws 
together official data from various annual reports by the Ministry of Agriculture (Kaushik 2005). 
Over and above the large amounts of land affected by zamindari abolition and private initiatives 
such as donations of land under the Bhoodan movement,
5 direct land distribution affected about 
2.5 mn hectares under programs to redistribute of ceiling surplus land, and 7.35 mn hectares under 
tenancy reform, implying a direct transfer of 5.45% of the area to about 5.35% of the agricultural 
population for the country as a whole. Comparing this to what has been involved in other land 
                                                 
4 Many states combined legislation to improve the situation of tenants with either a complete prohibition of land leasing or provisions to 
provide tenants who had been on the land for some time with very strong property rights, something that is likely to have limited new 
supply of land to the rental market (Deininger et al. 2007). 
 
5 The amount of land donated voluntarily and distributed under the Bhoodan movement amounted to 0,7 mn ha by 2004, with focus on 
Bihar, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh(Government of India 2006a). While some of these donations may have been motivated by a desire to 
avoid being affected by ceiling laws, we subsume all of these under the indirect effects of legal measures.  9 
 
reforms  internationally  illustrates  the  size  of  India’s  land  reform.
6 Ceiling  and  tenancy  laws 
together  resulted  in  the  redistribution  of  about  10%  of  arable  land,  about  the  level  of  the 
Philippines, Brazil, or Zimbabwe before 2000, but below Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan (33.3%, 27.3%, and 26.9%) or even El Salvador, Bolivia, and Mexico (27.9%, 32.3%, 
and 13.5%). In terms of the share of rural households benefiting, India’s accomplishment is at the 
lower end of the scale; while it exceeds what has been accomplished in the pre-1994 period in 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Brazil (1.6%, 3.1%, and 5.4% of the rural population, respectively), it 
remains considerably below other Asian countries such as the Philippines (24%), Japan (60.9%), 
and Taiwan (62.5%) or Latin American ones such as Mexico (67.5%), Bolivia (47.5%), and El 
Salvador (16.8%).  
Comparing  the  share  of  beneficiary  households  to  that  of  the  area  transferred  points  towards 
considerable variation across states. In some cases, e.g. Kerala or West Bengal, 12.5% and 10.8% 
of the population benefited from transfer of 8.5% and 6.4% of the land area, respectively, plot 
sizes for land transferred remained considerable below the state average. While some states (e.g. 
Gujarat or Tamil Nadu) provided beneficiaries with plots of about average size, in most of the 
states the fact that the share of beneficiaries remains significantly below the area share points 
towards transfer of above-average plot sizes, as in Maharashtra (27% of area distributed to 10.7% 
of population), Karnataka (15.4% and 5.3%), AP and MP (3.5% and 2.2% to 0.75% and 0.61% of 
population, respectively).  
With 4.4% and 2.3%, the share of area redistributed overall or share of households benefiting from 
ceiling  laws  has  been  below  the  figures  for  tenancy  reform.  Although  some  states  such  as 
Rajasthan, UP, Bihar, and AP transferred more land (6.6%, 5.8%, 4.4%, and 8.3%) under ceiling 
legislation than through  tenancy  reform, results seem  to  have been  biased towards transfer of 
above-average sized plots of land, suggesting that even where it was possible to acquire above 
                                                 
6 Note that the two measures considered here, i.e. tenancy reform and distribution of above-ceiling land, are in addition to any lands 
transferred through zamindari abolition.  10 
 
ceiling land by the state, overcoming political pressures in the distribution of such land may have 
been difficult. In West Bengal, on the other hand, a state that ranks at or near the top for both 
measures and that counts with a formidable level of grassroots-level organization, land reform land 
appears to have been transferred in a very pro-poor fashion.  
For the country as a whole, an average of 2.1 land reform laws had been passed per state with the 
mean law being about 13 years old in 1999. Despite the fact that the highest number of laws was 
passed in West Bengal where reform-induced transfers were also highest, the correlation between 
number of laws and the share of area transferred through or of rural households benefiting from 
reform is, with 0.28, low throughout. This supports the notion that legal provisions alone did not 
automatically translate into action on the ground, consistent with arguments that there is no a-
priori reason to expect a positive link between passage of laws -which could be a result of an 
objective need for land reform and political mobilization or even lack of actual progress- and their 
actual implementation. In fact, in a number of states, high levels of legal activity appear to have 
been used to deflect attention from lack of progress on the ground. 
While not differentiated in the table, a detailed look at the time dimension of reform measures 
allows a number of conclusions (Kaushik 2005): After a spurt of land transfers in the 1970s and 
1980s, progress has slowed down considerably; in fact between 1995/96 and 2003/04, i.e. for 
almost a decade, progress in awarding land rights to tenants had come to a complete standstill; the 
increment in ceiling surplus land transferred during the period amounted to only 10,800 hectares. 
The latter represents about one tenth of the land declared ceiling surplus, with the remainder being 
tied  up  in  litigation.  This  suggests  that,  unless  there  are  significant  changes  in  the  overall 
parameters, progress in achieving further redistribution of ceiling land could be slow -it would 
take  almost  90  years  to  dispose  of  remaining  ceiling  surplus  cases  if  the  current  pace  is 
maintained-  but  also  that,  by  clogging  up  the  court  system  and  preventing  it  from  quickly 
dispensing  justice  in  other  urgent  matters,  the  ceiling  legislation  may  impose  external  effects 11 
 
beyond land rental markets (Moog 1997).
7  While broader changes in the legal framework could 
make much additional land available, they do not seem to be too likely in the current political 
environment.  
Despite considerable interest in the topic at the policy level and a large literature documenting the 
way  land  reforms  were  put  in  practice  at  the  state  level  (Yugandhar  1996,  Thangaraj  2004), 
attempts to quantitatively assess their economic impacts at a national scale are surprisingly scant. 
One study finds that the number of identifiable land reform laws across states is positively related 
to the extent of poverty reduction but not agricultural productivity (Besley and Burgess 2000). 
While this could be used to make the case for land reform as a redistributive measure, e.g. through 
a wage effect, use of a measure only weakly linked to implementation of reforms is a shortcoming. 
Studies using data on implementation have only been conducted in individual states, mainly West 
Bengal.  District  level  data  point  towards  a  positive  impact  of  land  reform  on  productivity 
(Banerjee et al. 2002), a finding that receives support from household level evidence taking into 
account  other  political  factors  (Bardhan  and  Mookherjee  2006).  However,  as  the  policy 
environment  in  West  Bengal  is  likely  to  be  uniquely  conducive  to  land  reform,  a  national 
assessment of land reform impact based on actual implementation would be very desirable in view 
of the continued relevance of the topic in India’s policy debate (Government of India 2006b).  
2.3 Hypotheses on land reform impact  
Contrary to most empirical studies that have derived estimates of land reform impact from 
aggregate data at the district of state level, we use plot and household level information collected 
from a large survey in West Bengal. We expect the reform land to have lower productivity than 
land with full ownership due to the fact that tenancy reform land (barga land) is also sharecropped 
land.  As  tenants  will  be  rewarded  with  a  proportional  of  crop  production,  their  incentive  to 
                                                 
7 Two main reasons for court cases are contestation by landlords and instances where beneficiaries were allocated land but were either 
unable to establish effective possession or were subsequently evicted. A field survey to explore this issue in Andhra Pradesh pointed to 
at least 20% of beneficiaries who were not able to access the property they had received although the number of those who are able to 
file court cases calling for their (re)instatement is much more limited.  12 
 
undertake  (non-contractible)  land  investment,  to  use  adequate  inputs,  and  to  exert  effort  in 
cultivating it will be reduced, compared to what would be the case under full ownership. This will 
reduce the productivity of land use at any given point in time, thereby implying an indirect cost of 
this type of land reform.  The fact that the reform land cannot be subleased is expected to further 
discourage tenants to make long-term investments.   
  
3. Data and Estimation Strategy 
A listing exercise of the entire population from more than 200 selected villages in 10 
districts  of  West  Bengal  was  carried  out,  in  which  94,000  households  are  listed.  This  listing 
contained information on the beneficiary status and current tenure status, and was used as a sample 
frame for the next round survey.  Data used in this on productivity and investments comes from a 
detailed survey of households in 142 villages in the 10 districts. Altogether, about 2000 household 
were interviewed, and detailed plot level data on nearly 9,585 plots were collected. An official list 
of 1978 land reform beneficiaries was used to draw the village sample in which the bargadars were 
over  sampled  to  make  sure  enough  beneficiaries  are  included.  The  listing  exercise  collected 
detailed information on land tenure, plots (both own and reform land), main physical assets as well 
as household demographic characteristics both at the initial period of 1978 and at present, detailed 
history of land change (either through inheritance or through market transactions), literacy and 
years of education attained for all the members of the dynasty households (i.e. for the head of 1978 
household, head of the current household and all the children) is available. The listing data provide 
a unique opportunity to understand the targeting and historical background of the reform which we 
will describe in more detail in the section to follow. In the follow up survey, detailed information 
on input, output of crop production and various types of land investment for all the agricultural 
plots were collected to test the inefficiency hypotheses. 
3.1. Household characteristics of Reform Beneficiaries in 1978   13 
 
Land reform was targeted towards the poor and landless households at the time of reform. 
By comparing household initial characteristics between land beneficiaries (bargadars or pattadars) 
with those who were not affected by either type of the reform, we are able to assess whether the 
tenancy  and  ceiling  reforms  indeed  served  the  redistributive  role  as  initially  intended.   The 
descriptive evidence as obtained from the first round listing data from Table 3 suggests that the 
beneficiaries of both types of reform are indeed those households who had endowed with little or 
no land and were relatively poorer and whose livelihood was more dependent upon agricultural 
sector.    In  1978,  the  average  land  endowment,  inclusive  of  patta  land,  for  barga  and  patta 
beneficiary was respectively 1.92 acres and 1.31 acres, which was considerably lower than 2.54 
acres, the average land endowment of those households who were not affected by the reform. 
While share of landless households between barga beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is about the 
same in 1978 (55%  and 57%, respectively), the share of landless households among the patta 
beneficiaries are considerably higher (75%), which is as expected as ceiling land is mainly to 
support the landless households. 
Examining the occupational structure of the beneficiaries, it can be seen that both patta 
and barga households heavily rely on agricultural sector.  While 91 percent of barga households 
and 87 percent of patta households reported that their head’s main occupation is either working for 
agricultural  wage  or  farming,  76  percent  of  the  households  who  were not  affected  by  reform 
reported so. The limited number of indicators for welfare that were included in the survey (i.e. 
namely the condition of roof and wall) tends to suggest that reform beneficiaries were poorer than  
non-beneficiaries. For example, 83 percent of barga and 90 percent of patta beneficiaries reported 
to have bad quality roof (ie. identified as thatched, or of plastic or mud) as compared to 70 percent 
of non-beneficiaries who reported so.   
Finally, land reform also benefited more households from lower castes, as indicated by the 
fact that 56 percent of barga beneficiaries and 73 percent of patta beneficiaries are from the most 14 
 
marginalized Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) as compared to as compared to 43 
percent of households who were not affect by reform were from SC/ST. 
3.2. Descriptive evidence on productivity, input use intensity and land investments  
By comparing productivity by land reform status, we try to gain some insights regarding 
the differentials in productivity which exist between tenant and owner cultivated land. We find 
there exist significant negative correlation between crop productivity and tenancy. 
Table 4 shows that the average plot size of tenants is 0.36 acres respectively as compared 
to  0.46  acres  those  of  owner  occupied  plots.    Data  on  production  at  the  plot  level  suggests 
considerable difference between tenancy plots and owner plots.  For example, average annual 
gross revenue of crop production on own plots is 33 percentage points higher than that for tenancy 
plots (22059 Rs. vs. 16578 Rs.). The difference is consistent for the two main crop seasons (Rabi 
season and Kharif seasons – Check the number??? This is not really the case in the table).  A 
similar pattern can be observed if we focus on the yield of rice crop (the most important staple 
crop in West Bengal, with own plot yield at 1925 kgs and that of tenancy plots at 1843 kgs).  We 
also see that input usage of all the inputs used in cultivation is lower on tenancy land as compared 
to the land under full ownership. In addition, plot level characteristics suggest poorer irrigation 
conditions for tenancy land than for own land. On average, as we see from table 4, 74% of tenancy 
land has access to irrigation as compared to 83% on owned land.  
Table 5 shows different types of land investments by tenancy status. The investment data 
suggests some consistent evidence that the proportion of plots received land related investment is 
much higher for own land than for tenancy land.   While 43% and 10% of own plots have access to 
bore wells and ponds respectively, the corresponding figures for tenancy land is only 38% and 6%, 
respectively,  The difference is even more striking in other land improvements. Farmers made soil 
improvements on 40% of own plots, but the same type of investment was made only on 10% of 
tenancy plots.  
3.3. Estimation Strategy 15 
 
The descriptive data given in table 4 and 5 is in general consistent with our hypothesis of low 
productivity and investment of reform land.  The average crop productivity, input use intensity and 
investment in land, are all lower for tenancy plots than for own land.  The descriptive evidence 
while informative, they are not casual and therefore have limited policy relevance.  In order to test 
whether  the  descriptive  evidence  also  holds  after  the  household  fixed  effects  and  plot  level 
characteristics  are  controlled  for,  we  rely  on  more  rigorous  econometrics  analysis  to  test  our 
hypotheses.   We use the methods employed by Shaban (1987) to investigate the impact of tenancy 
reform on productivity, input use intensity and long-term investment.  
The  equation  to  estimate  the  Marshallian  inefficiency  with  the  plot  level  production  and 
investment data is: 
 
∑ + + + + = ij r j i ik i D X R Y e d f b a   (1) 
 
Where  Yi  is  the  gross  yield  or  revenue  of  the  cultivated  plot  (or  input  usage  on  the  plot  or 
investment variables), the variable Rik is a dummy to indicate whether land is under tenancy. D 
measures the distance of the plot from the household dwelling.  The identification strategy used 
compares the crop yield or inputs use between the tenancy plots (barga plots) and owned plots 
after  controlling  for  the  cultivator  household  fixed  effect.  We  also  control  for  the  soil 
characteristics using a number of indicators of soil quality. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
To determine whether the productivity and long-term investment of reform land is indeed lower 
than  that  of  land  with  full  ownership  as  suggested  in  the  descriptive  analysis,  we  regress 
production variables (yield, value and net value) and investment variables (whether certain type of 
investment was made) of a plot on plot characteristics including area size, distance to homestead, 
and  a  large  number  of  variables  on  soil  characteristics,  and  tenure  status  and  we  control  for 
household fixed effects.  16 
 
Table 6 reports regression results for productivity when productivity is measured by the gross 
revenue  receipts  from  all  crops  on  a  given  plot.  We  further  divided  productivity  into  annual 
productivity (columns 1 and 2), productivity for the Rabi season (columns 3 and 4) and for Kharif 
season (columns 5 and 6).  For each type of productivity, we have two specifications; a base model  
and an augmented model.  In the base model, productivity is regressed on only two variables - the 
tenancy dummy and plot size.  In the augmented model, additional plot characteristics variables 
such as irrigation status and distance to homestead and a large number of soil characteristics (such 
as soil types, soil color, soil salinity, percolation and drainage) are also added to the explanatory 
variables. The regression results are highly consistent with the descriptive findings as illustrated by 
the fact that the coefficient on the tenancy dummy variable is negative and significant at 1% level 
of significance for all columns. We find that the annual productivity based on the base model is 22 
percentage points lower for the tenancy land than own land.  Adding plot and soil characteristics 
reduced the magnitude of productivity difference between own and tenancy land to 15 percentage 
points.  The significant productivity difference exists in both crop seasons. In Kharif season, the 
seasonal productivity is eight percentage lower in tenancy land than own land.  The difference in 
Rabi seasons is even larger, 13.4 percentage points or 12.3 percentage points depending on the 
model specifications.  
In Table 7, we include regression using log of Net Value measured in Rupees. The net value was 
reached  after  netting  all  input  costs.  Here  we  find  that  the  net  value  of  output  again  differs 
substantially between the tenancy and owned plots, and the difference is as high 18% for aggregate, 
8% for Kharif, and 13% for Rabi season, where all are statistically significant at 1%. In Table 8, 
we limit the estimates to one main crop of rice. The estimates show the yield measured in Kgs and 
value of rice. in rupees to be statistically different between tenancy land and own land with the 
magnitude of difference between 6% and 7%. 
The reason production differences arise partially from differences in application of inputs as 
seen  from  the  regression  of  inputs  usage.  The  input  cost  is  divided  into  a  number  of  heads 17 
 
depending upon the physical factors, and are used to estimate the input intensity on the tenancy 
plots  as  compared  to  the  owner  cultivated  plot.  These  regressions  with  inputs  as  dependent 
variables are shown in columns of Table 9 and 10. Table 9 is Linear Probability Model, capturing 
the likelihood that a particular input will be used in cultivation on the plot.  We find that inputs 
like pesticide and irrigation are less likely to be used on the tenancy plots, even after controlling 
for the cultivator household fixed effect. We find that the farming on tenancy plots reduces the 
probability of pesticide use by 2.2% and that of irrigation by nearly 8%. We estimate the intensity 
of usage of inputs in Table 10, and find tenancy status reduces the usage of inputs on average by 
11% for fertilizer and manure, 3% for pesticides, 6% for seeds, and 9% for casual labor hired. 
Given these results we find that if the plot is under tenancy, cultivator is likely to use fewer inputs, 
and we also find that the productivity of these plots is less than those of owner occupied. 
Finally, Table 11 reports the regression results on land investment.  The regression results 
show  that  larger  plots  or  plots  that  are  closer  to  homestead  are  more  likely  to  receive  land 
investment, which is not surprising.  The regression results are also highly consistent with the 
descriptive findings, as illustrated by the negative and significant coefficients on tenancy land 
dummy for all the regressions.  The base model results suggest that compared to own land, barga 
land is 6.5% less likely to receive private irrigation investment or even more strikingly 29% less 
likely to receive land conservation or other types of land investment.  The results also do not 
change much as the model is augmented by a large set of soil type and soil physical characteristics.   
 
5. Conclusion 
A wide scale reform of cultivable land was legislated in India several decades ago.  However, 
these reforms still have implications for the households which are cultivating reform land. The 
land under reform, which provides inheritable and permanent tenancy on these plots, is found to be 
less productive than the land which is owner cultivated. This study found lower yield, less gross 
value and less net value on the plots which are cultivated by a tenant compared to that on own 18 
 
plots  by  the  same  tenant.  These  differences  in  productivity  on  the  two  types  of  plots,  after 
controlling for land quality and irrigation facilities, are found to be attributable to differences in 
input usage and labor used on the two types of plot. The divergence between optimal use of inputs 
and labor under when land is owner cultivated or cultivated by a tenant generating the loss of 
productivity on this land.  We also found that tenants have less incentive to make long-term land 
investment on reform land than their own land.  Therefore tenancy land is also associated with 
long-term dynamic inefficiency, an important aspect that has been mostly neglected in previous 
impact studies on India tenancy reform. Appropriate policy to address this loss of productivity on 
reform land needs to be devised.  These differences in productivity can be mitigated by making 
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Table 1: Global extent and characteristics of land reforms 
Country  Area   Beneficiary households   Area per   Implementation 
   Total area   Share of arable  Number  Share of rural   household  Period 
   (1000 hectares)  Land (%)  (thousands)  Households (%)  (hectares)   
Africa                   
Egypt  390  15.4  438  10.0  0.89  1952–78 
Kenya   403  1.6  34  1.6  11.85  1961–70 
Zimbabwe  2,371  11.9  40  3.1  59.28  1980–87 
Asia                   
Japan  2,000  33.3  4,300  60.9  0.47  1946–49 
Korea, Rep. of  577  27.3  1,646  45.5  0.35  1948–58 
Philippines  1,092  10.8  1,511  24.2  0.72  1940–85 
Taiwan, China  235  26.9  383  62.5  0.61  1949–53 
Central America                   
El Salvador  401  27.9  95  16.8  4.22  1932–89 
Mexico  13,375  13.5  3,044  67.5  4.39  1915–76 
Nicaragua  3,186  47.1  172  56.7  18.52  1978–87 
South America                   
Bolivia  9,792  32.3  237  47.5  41.32  1953–70 
Brasil  13,100  11.3  266  5.4  49.32  1964–94 
Chile  9,517  60.1  58  12.7  164.09  1973 
Peru  8,599  28.1  375  30.8  22.93  1969–79 
Source: Deininger (2003).  
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Table 2: Shares of rural households and arable land area affected by different land reforms in Indian States 
   Tenancy legislation   Ceiling legislation 
State  Area (%)  Pop. (%)  No. of laws  Average age   Area (%)  Pop. (%) 
Andhra Pradesh  3.48  0.75  2  17.0  8.34  3.81 
Bihar   0.00  0.00  3  18.3  4.42  4.00 
Gujarat  15.00  11.20  2  15.5  1.95  0.31 
Haryana  0.51  0.01  0  0  1.26  0.26 
Himachal Pradesh  0.16  3.19  n.a.  n.a.  0.06  0.05 
Karnataka  15.38  5.29  2  14.5  1.71  0.30 
Kerala  8.47  12.49  4  10.8  1.30  1.04 
Madhya Pradesh  2.15  0.61  1  24.0  2.69  0.71 
Maharashtra   27.01  10.68  1  23.0  7.74  1.08 
Orissa  0.15  1.43  3  9.0  2.24  1.28 
Punjab   1.89  0.04  1  10.0  1.50  0.25 
Rajasthan  0.00  0.16  0  0  6.63  0.75 
Tamil Nadu  3.65  3.23  5  13.6  2.47  1.24 
Uttar Pradesh  0.00  0.00  2  14.5  5.81  3.68 
West Bengal   6.41  10.80  5  8.2  14.91  19.73 
Total  5.45  5.35  2.1  13.03  4.41  2.27 
Source: Kaushik (2005) for columns 1 to 4; Besley and Burgess (2000) for columns (5) and (6)  
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Table 3: Reform Beneficiary Statistics (1978) 
   Total  Barga  Patta  Lose land 
Not 
affected 




es       
household characteristics in 78           
Household size  6.21  6.49  5.84  7.35  6.19 
Land endowment in 78 (inc'dg 
patta)  2.54  1.92  1.31  6.90  2.55 
landless in 78 (exc'dg patta land)  0.57  0.55  0.75  0.10  0.57 
SC/ST  0.45  0.56  0.73  0.17  0.43 
78 head literate  0.25  0.22  0.14  0.68  0.25 
Head's occup: Ag wage   0.36  0.30  0.54  0.04  0.36 
                        Farming  0.40  0.61  0.33  0.60  0.38 
                        Non-farm wage  0.12  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.13 
                        Self-employment  0.12  0.04  0.06  0.31  0.12 
Non-land assets in 78           
Bad roof (thatch/plastic/mud)  0.72  0.83  0.90  0.55  0.70 
Bad wall (mud/bamboo)  0.70  0.85  0.78  0.59  0.69 
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Table 4: Plot level production statistics (current) 
  
   ALL  OWNER PLOTS  TENANCY PLOTS 
PLOT CHARACTERISTICS       
Own land (%)  0.60  1.00  0.00 
Tenancy land (%)  0.40  0.00  1.00 
Plot Area (acre)  0.40  0.36  0.46 
Irrigation (%)  0.79  0.83  0.74 
CROP VALUE (in Rupees)       
Rabi   8562.59  9965.52  6493.54 
Kharif  8846.03  8872.75  8806.64 
Total   19844.49  22059.35  16578.01 
YIELD - RICE (in Kilograms)       
Rabi   606.51  644.66  550.25 
Kharif  1278.46  1273.02  1286.49 
Total   1892.45  1925.10  1844.30 
INPUTS (In Rupees)       
Seeds  1256.54  1428.47  1002.97 
Fertilizer  1939.87  2195.05  1563.52 
Pesticide  605.34  666.13  515.69 
Bullock  119.47  126.17  109.60 
Tractor  643.72  700.76  559.60 
Irrigation   990.62  1106.71  819.41 
Transport  247.65  260.10  229.29 
Other inputs  53.93  70.32  29.74 
Plots: n=9283 26 
 
Table 5:  Land investments by land tenure status : Plot level evidence 
   ALL  OWN   BARGA 
Private Irrigation Access          
Share of plots with  private irrigation  0.485  0.534  0.446 
Share of plots with  pond irrigation  0.085  0.104  0.062 
Share of plots with  bore well irrigation  0.400  0.432  0.379 
Construction & Maintenance of Private 
Irrigation Asset          
Total cash cost (Rs.)  5511  6322  4762 
Number of hired labor (Days)  3.08  3.76  2.32 
Number of family labor (Days)  0.48  0.64  0.27 
Number of exchange labor (Days)  0.05  0.05  0.07 
Total cash spent during 8 years(Rs.)  116.95  164.45  57.93 
Total labor days contributed during last 8 years 
(days)  0.33  0.46  0.16 
Land, Soil, and Water Conservation           
Share of plots with land/soil/water conservation 
in the past 8 years  0.293  0.401  0.135 
Total amount of cash spent during last 8years 
(Rs.)  145.94  215.91  51.37 
Share of households using any family labor 
during past 8 years  0.236  0.325  0.107 
Total family labor used (days)  519  740  207 
Number of observation  8913  5223  3300 27 
 
Table 6: Tenancy and productivity 
Dependent variable: Gross revenue of crop production on per unit of land (Rs./acre) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 









                    
Plot area  -0.010  -0.011  -0.008  -0.004  -0.031  -0.024 
(0.014)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.019) 
Tenancy  -0.217***  -0.148***  -0.079***  -0.079***  -0.134***  -0.123*** 
(0.026)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Distance  -0.067***  -0.004  -0.015 
(0.017)  (0.004)  (0.019) 
Irrigation  0.650***  -0.003  0.112 
(0.040)  (0.015)  (0.134) 
Constant  9.721***  9.807***  9.152***  9.167***  9.534***  9.321*** 
(0.024)  (0.132)  (0.011)  (0.049)  (0.033)  (0.242) 
Soil Characteristics  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Observations  9,116  9,009  8,329  8,237  4,666  4,607 
R-squared  0.051  0.231  0.026  0.028  0.025  0.040 
Number of hhidgrp  1,772  1,772  1,649  1,649  1,223  1,217 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Cluster effect at village level is controlled             
Soil Characteristics include soil type, color, characteristics, percolation, salinity and drainage     




Table 7: Tenancy and productivity (Fixed effect model) 
Dependent variable: Net value of crop production on per unit of land (Rs/acre) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Net Value  Net Value  Net Value    Net Value    Net Value  Net Value   
Kharif   Kharif    Rabi   Rabi 
                    
Plot area  0.057*  0.061**  0.024***  0.025***  0.012  0.027 
(0.029)  (0.028)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
Tenancy  -0.249***  -0.187***  -0.088***  -0.087***  -0.137***  -0.123*** 
(0.039)  (0.036)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.027) 
Distance  -0.073***  0.001  -0.039 
(0.021)  (0.008)  (0.024) 
Irrigation  0.469***  0.009  -0.097 
(0.071)  (0.015)  (0.179) 
Constant  9.341***  9.429***  8.923***  8.915***  9.037***  9.229*** 
(0.047)  (0.198)  (0.012)  (0.061)  (0.044)  (0.278) 
Soil Characteristics  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Observations  9,116  9,009  8,258  8,166  4,436  4,381 
R-squared  0.014  0.044  0.024  0.028  0.012  0.026 
Number of hhidgrp  1,772  1,772  1,643  1,643  1,193  1,187 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Cluster effect at village level is controlled             
Soil Characteristics include soil type, color, characteristics, percolation, salinity and drainage  29 
 
Table 8: Tenancy and rice yield (Fixed effect model) 
Dependent variable: rice yield (kg/acre) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Yield  Yield  Value  Value 
(Rice)  (Rice)  (Rice)  (Rice) 
              
Plot Area  -0.011  -0.009  -0.013*  -0.011 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Distance  -0.003  -0.002  -0.000  0.001 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Tenancy  -0.066***  -0.066***  -0.071***  -0.071*** 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Rabi  0.298***  0.300***  0.309***  0.309*** 
(0.049)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
Pre Kharif  0.079*  0.081*  -0.038  -0.037 
(0.045)  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Constant  7.231***  7.218***  9.136***  9.098*** 
(0.036)  (0.044)  (0.036)  (0.048) 
Soil Characteristics  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Observations  11,128  11,071  11,075  11,021 
R-squared  0.174  0.176  0.156  0.157 
Number of hhidgrp  1,763  1,763  1,755  1,755 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1              
Cluster effect at village level is controlled             















Table 9: Tenancy and input usage (Fixed effect linear probability model) 
Dependent variable: dummy for whether a certain type of input is used at all or not 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES  Fertilizer  Pesticide  Seeds  Irrigation  Bullock  Tractor  Transport  Casual   Permanent 
& Manure  Labor  & Family Labor 
                             
Plot area  0.009***  0.021***  0.007**  0.014***  0.013***  0.042***  0.032***  0.172***  0.007* 
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.004) 
Tenancy  -0.001  -0.022***  0.006**  -0.075***  -0.001  0.002  -0.010  -0.013  0.008*** 
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Distance  0.005  0.003  0.015**  -0.040***  -0.003  0.013*  0.005  0.011*  0.008 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Irrigation  0.042***  0.174***  0.018  -0.002  0.028*  0.059***  0.015  0.024** 
(0.011)  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.010) 
Constant  0.930***  0.821***  0.887***  0.552***  0.177***  0.478***  0.335***  0.859***  0.906*** 
(0.026)  (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.036)  (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.040) 
Soil Characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164 
R-squared  0.018  0.073  0.014  0.009  0.036  0.025  0.171  0.010 
Number of hhidgrp  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Cluster effect at village level is controlled             











Table 10: Tenancy and input use intensity (Fixed effect model) 
Dependent variable: input use intensity (Rupees per acre)  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES  Fertilizer  Pesticide  Seeds  Irrigation  Bullock  Tractor  Transport  Casual  Permanent 
& Manure  Labor  & Family Labor 
                             
Plot area  -0.160***  -0.176***  -0.130***  -0.087***  -0.038**  -0.094***  -0.103***  0.361***  -0.337*** 
(0.026)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.050)  (0.024) 
Tenancy  -0.114***  -0.038*  -0.062**  -0.020  0.002  0.010  0.020*  -0.088**  -0.019 
(0.024)  (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.017) 
Distance  -0.034**  -0.035**  -0.025*  0.006  0.008  0.004  0.021**  0.012  -0.011 
(0.017)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
Irrigation  0.764***  0.529***  0.734***  0.023  0.169***  0.091***  0.356***  0.453*** 
(0.046)  (0.043)  (0.061)  (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.058)  (0.038) 
Constant  6.967***  5.880***  6.395***  7.144***  6.074***  6.350***  5.628***  11.041***  10.438*** 
(0.169)  (0.146)  (0.171)  (0.100)  (0.135)  (0.124)  (0.107)  (0.223)  (0.137) 
Soil Characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164  9,164 
R-squared  0.756  0.872  0.639  0.962  0.920  0.923  0.918  0.881  0.890 
Number of hhidgrp  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777  1,777 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Cluster effect at village level is controlled             










Table 11: Tenancy and land investments (Fixed effect linear probability model) 
Dependent variable: dummy variable for whether investment is made or not 
Private Irri.  Bore well 
Conserva 













































Soil characteristics         Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  8329  8270  8329  8329  8329  8329 
Number of households  1624  1623  1624  1624  1624  1624 
R-squared  0.03  0.01  0.18  0.04  0.02  0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Cluster effect at village level is controlled             
Soil Characteristics include soil type, color, characteristics, percolation, salinity and drainage  
 